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Remove libcap support

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This is simply a false sense of security, and is worse than just using
setuid. CAP_SYS_ADMIN is an extremely serious capability that is
effectively as powerful as root.

It also required users to be in the input group, which allows any
process to keylog the entire system.
This commit is contained in:
Scott Anderson 2020-04-28 20:44:05 +12:00 • committed by Simon Ser
parent 98d949718c
commit 906c0766df
8 changed files with 1 additions and 45 deletions
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18
backend/session/direct-ipc.c
View file

@ -24,23 +24,6 @@
enum { DRM_MAJOR = 226 };
#if WLR_HAS_LIBCAP
#include <sys/capability.h>
static bool have_permissions(void) {
cap_t cap = cap_get_proc();
cap_flag_value_t val;
if (!cap || cap_get_flag(cap, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_PERMITTED, &val) || val != CAP_SET) {
wlr_log(WLR_ERROR, "Do not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN; cannot become DRM master");
cap_free(cap);
return false;
}
cap_free(cap);
return true;
}
#else
static bool have_permissions(void) {
#ifdef __linux__
if (geteuid() != 0) {
@ -50,7 +33,6 @@ static bool have_permissions(void) {
#endif
return true;
}
#endif
static void send_msg(int sock, int fd, void *buf, size_t buf_len) {
char control[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(fd))] = {0};