Wim Taymans 7465199fff security: replace unsafe atoi() with validated parsing in websocket ... Input Validation: High The WebSocket HTTP reply parser used atoi() to parse the Content-Length header from network data. atoi() does not detect overflow or invalid input, and its int return value was assigned to a size_t, meaning a negative value from a malicious server would silently convert to a very large unsigned value, potentially causing excessive memory allocation. Replaced with spa_atou32() which validates the entire string is a valid number and fits in uint32_t, plus an explicit upper bound (16 MB) on content length to prevent resource exhaustion. Similarly, pw_websocket_listen() used atoi() to parse the port number into a uint16_t without validation. Replaced with spa_atou32() and a range check against 65535. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>		2026-04-28 12:14:36 +02:00
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regress.h	sendspin: add sendspin sender and receiver	2026-02-26 12:17:17 +01:00
sendspin.h	zeroconf: sanitize the properties	2026-02-27 17:31:42 +01:00
teeny-sha1.c	sendspin: add sendspin sender and receiver	2026-02-26 12:17:17 +01:00
websocket.c	security: replace unsafe atoi() with validated parsing in websocket	2026-04-28 12:14:36 +02:00
websocket.h	sendspin: add sendspin sender and receiver	2026-02-26 12:17:17 +01:00